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Note: Contributory Negligence and Assumption of Risk-
The Case for Their Merger
I. INTRODUCTION
At common law the plaintiff in a negligence action was
barred from recovery when his conduct constituted either con-
tributory negligence or assumption of risk. As a result of the
adoption of a comparative negligence statute in Minnesota,' con-
tributory negligence no longer completely bars recovery but only
reduces recoverable damages. The statute, however, is silent as
to assumption of risk. Since the purpose of the statute is to al-
low a plaintiff to recover part of his damages despite the fact
that his conduct fails to meet the reasonable man standard of
care, as long as his negligence is less than that of the defendant,
and since both contributory negligence and assumption of risk
describe unreasonable conduct by the plaintiff, the purpose of the
comparative negligence statute would be frustrated if assumption
of risk continued to operate as a complete bar to recovery. In a
recent case,2 the Minnesota supreme court recognized this problem
and noted that the comparative negligence statute made it neces-
sary to decide whether some types of assumption of risk should
be merged with contributory negligence and thus be controlled
by the comparative negligence statute. This note will explore
the various distinctions between contributory negligence and as-
sumption of risk to determine whether both defenses should be
controlled by the comparative negligence statute.
1. MAb=. STAT. § 604.01(1) (1969):
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by
any person or his legal representative to recover damages for
negligence resulting in death or injury to person or property, if
such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person
against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall
be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence at-
tributable to the person recovering.
2. In Parness v. Economics Laboratory, Inc., 284 Minn. 381, 386,
170 N.W.2d 554, 557 (1969), the court made the following observation:
However plaintiffs vigorously urge that in this type of case,
where the defenses overlap, it is both confusing and unfair to
submit them as separate and distinct and that we should follow
the New Jersey court and abolish the defense of assumption of
risk .... While we acknowledge the persuasiveness of plain-
tiffs' argument, we decline to accept it at this time, as we find
no significant prejudice to plaintiffs' rights in the trial of this
case and we anticipate that the question will be more meaning-
fully presented under the recently enacted statute abolishing
contributory negligence as a complete defense.
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II. DEFINITION AND DEVELOPMENT
OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK
Assumption of risk is actually two separate and distinct doc-
trines:3 primary and secondary assumption of risk. Primary
assumption of risk is not an affirmative defense, but a way of
expressing the idea that where the defendant owes no duty to
the plaintiff he cannot be negligent.4 It is a consequence of a
voluntary relationship in which the duty owed by one party to
another with respect to the risks incident to their relationship is
limited.5 Secondary assumption of risk is a more common doc-
trine. It is an affirmative defense to an established breach of
duty, and may be raised only when the plaintiff has voluntarily
encountered a known and appreciated risk."
A. PRIMARY ASSUMPTION OF RISK
This doctine originated in master-servant cases 7 and has sub-
sequently been applied in situations where a voluntary relation-
3. See generally Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31
N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAw OF TORTS
§ 21.1 (1956); James, Assumption of Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141 (1952).
4. See authorities cited in note 3 supra.
5. Id.
6. Knutson v. Arrigoni Bros., 275 Minn. 408, 413, 147 N.W.2d 561,
565 (1966) (essential elements in assumption of risk are a knowledge of
the danger and an intelligent acquiscence in it); Schrader v. Kriesel, 232
Minn. 238, 247, 45 N.W.2d 395, 400 (1950) (assumption of risk involves
comprehension that a peril is to be encountered and a willingness to en-
counter it); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D (1965) (plaintiff
does not assume a risk of harm arising from the defendant's conduct un-
less he knows of the existence of the risk and appreciates its unreason-
able character); Id. at § 496E (plaintiff does not assume a risk of harm
unless he voluntarily accepts the risk).
7. Martin v. Des Moines Edison Light Co., 131 Iowa 724, 732, 106
N.W. 359, 362 (1906) (where master owed no duty, servant assumed risks
incident to employment); Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 45 Mass.
49 (1842) (injury caused by negligence of fellow servant held to be an
incidental risk and thus not a breach of duty by the master); Gray v.
Commutator Co., 85 Minn. 463, 469, 89 N.W 322, 324 (1902); Ransier v.
Minneapolis and St. Louis Ry., 32 Minn. 331, 335, 20 N.W. 332, 334 (1884);
Madden v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry., 32 Minn. 303, 305, 20 N.W. 317,
318 (1884) (master has duty to use reasonable care and skill to furnish
his servants safe and suitable instruments and means to perform their
services); Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co. v. Eldridge, 293 S.W. 901, 903 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1927) (where master owed servant no duty, servant assumed
the risks as a matter of law); Hutchinson v. Railway Co., 155 Eng. Rep.
150 (1850); Priestley v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1838) (duty of mas-
ter was to provide for the safety of servant to the best of master's "judg-
ment, information, and belief" which would relieve master of liability
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ship exists between the parties.8 Its fundamental elements are:
(1) the parties have entered into a voluntary relationship; (2)
the plaintiff, by entering into this relationship, assumes the risks
incidental to it; (3) the defendant has no duty with respect to
these incidental risks-thus if plaintiff's injury arises from an in-
cidental risk, defendant is not negligent because he did not breach
a duty; (4) the conduct of plaintiff in encountering the particular
risk is not relevant because he assumes the risk as a matter of
law when he voluntarily enters into the relationship with the
defendant-thus plaintiff assumes the risk even if his conduct is
reasonable and even if he does not know or appreciate the par-
ticular risk at the time he encounters it. Since primary assump-
tion of risk is not an affirmative defense, plaintiff is required
to plead and prove that the risk in question was not one he
assumed and that defendant therefore owed him a duty.0 Ques-
tions regarding the application of primary assumption of risk
arise where licensees are injured on the defendant's property,10
or where spectators are injured in baseball parks during games.' I
to servant for injuries suffered in the course of servant's employment).
Subsequent cases ruled that if a master provides a safe place to work, he
is relieved of liability.
The reasoning of the above cases is exemplified by the Minnesota
court's statement in Madden:
There is no difference as to the duty of the master and the as-
sumption of risk by the servant .... In all cases the servant
is held to take on himself risks necessarily incident to the em-
ployment... and in no case does he take on himself risks that
arise by reason of neglects on the part of the master.
32 Minn. at 306, 20 N.W. at 318.
8. Modee v. City of Eveleth, 224 Minn. 556, 29 N.W.2d 453 (1947).
A hockey spectator was struck by a puck. The lower court grantedjudgment notwithstanding the verdict, holding that plaintiff had assumed
the risk and that defendant was not negligent. That decision was af-
firmed after the court concluded that the dangers incident to a game of
hockey are matters of common knowledge. See also Olson v. Buskey,
220 Minn. 155, 19 N.W.2d 57 (1945) (automobile host and guest); Ben-jamin v. Nernberg, 102 Pa. Super. 471, 157 A. 10 (1931) (players on a golf
course).
9. Taylor v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 186 Iowa 506, 511, 170 N.W. 388,
390 (1919); Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 49, 155
A.2d 90, 93 (1959).
10. Sandstrom v. A.A.D. Temple Bldg. Ass'n, 267 Minn. 407, 411,
127 N.W.2d 173, 176 (1964) (reaffirmation of the prevailing view that li-
censee assumes the risk of defective conditions unknown to the occupier
of premises); Mazey v. Loveland, 133 Minn. 210, 158 N.W. 44 (1916)
(mere licensee must take premises as he finds them).
11. Aldes v. Saint Paul Ball Club, Inc., 251 Minn. 440, 88 N.W.2d 94(1958) (patron assumes the risk of injury from hazards inherent in the
sport, but risk of injury from proprietor's negligence is assumed only if
the risk is known and appreciated--an example of the application of pri-
mary and secondary assumption of risk in the same case); Brisson v.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
These cases can be disposed of on the ground that either the
defendant owes the plaintiff no duty or that the plaintiff as-
sumes the risk. Whichever analysis is used, the result is the
same. This leads to the conclusion that primary assumption of
risk serves only to confuse the "no-duty" analysis and therefore
should be abolished.' 2
Primary assumption of risk and contributory negligence,
however, are clearly separate and distinct doctrines. Unlike con-
tributory negligence, primary assumption of risk is not an affirma-
tive defense asserted by defendant after his negligence has been
established; it is used instead to deny negligence itself on the
ground that defendant breached no duty to the plaintiff. Pri-
mary assumption of risk is also not a measure of the conduct
of the plaintiff, as is contributory negligence; instead, it is a
measure of defendant's conduct that determines whether the de-
fendant has breached a duty to the plaintiff. Contributory neg-
ligence may be invoked as a defense only after it has been estab-
lished that the defendant was negligent, but primary assumption
of risk is applicable only if the defendant has breached no duty
and is therefore not negligent.
B. SECONDARY ASSUMPTION OF RISK
Secondary assumption of risk also originated in master-serv-
ant cases' 3 and is frequently used today. 14 Unlike primary as-
Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Ass'n, 185 Minn. 507, 240 N.W. 903
(1932) (management held not negligent if screens provided for the
most dangerous part of the grandstand; danger of being hit by a foul ball
held to be a risk that an adult of reasonable intelligence would appre-
ciate).
12. See, e.g., 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 21.1 (1956),
where the authors state that a "no duty" analysis is more appropriate;
this approach is probably correct.
13. Under primary assumption of risk analysis the servant did not
assume risks created by the master's negligence. However, if the servant
knew and appreciated those risks and voluntarily continued his employ-
ment, the servant then assumed those risks created by the master's negli-
gence. Martin v. Des Moines Edison Light Co., 131 Iowa 724, 735, 106
N.W. 359, 363 (1906). See generally Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attrac-
tions, 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959) (when the master breached his duty
to provide a safe place to work by providing defective machinery to his
servant, but the servant voluntarily continued his employment with full
knowledge and appreciation of the risk created by the master's negli-
gence, it was held that plaintiff had assumed the risk and could not re-
cover); Gray v. Commutator Co., 85 Minn. 463, 89 N.W. 322 (1902); Ran-
sier v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry., 32 Minn. 331, 20 N.W. 332 (1884);
Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co. v. Eldridge, 293 S.W. 901 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
14. Parness v. Economics Laboratory, Inc., 284 Minn. 381, 170
N.W.2d 554 (1969); Erickson v. Quarstad, 270 Minn. 42, 132 N.W.2d 814
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sumption of risk it is an affirmative defense asserted by the de-
fendant after his negligence has been established.' 5 The essential
element of secondary assumption of risk is that the plaintiff vol-
untarily chooses to encounter a known and appreciated danger
created by the negligence of the defendant."' It is similar to
contributory negligence 1 T in that both are affirmative defenses
based on the conduct of the plaintiff and must be asserted by
the defendant after his breach of duty has been established. The
theoretical distinction between the two defenses is clear: second-
ary assumption of risk rests upon plaintiff's voluntary consent
to take his chances, while contributory negligence rests upon
plaintiff's failure to exercise the care of a reasonable man for his
own protection. The element of unreasonable conduct essential
to a finding of contributory negligence is not necessary to a find-
ing that the plaintiff assumed a risk. This conceptual analysis,
however, is misleading in its simplicity. When the plaintiff vol-
untarily consents to take an unreasonable chance, the conduct by
the plaintiff constitutes both assumption of risk and contributory
negligence. This fact has been recognized by the Minnesota su-
preme court.'8 It was also recognized in a major debate in the
preparation of Restatement (Second) of Torts over whether as-
sumption of risk should be a separate section or should constitute
a part of the contributory negligence section.' 9 Dean Prosser de-
(1964); Aldes v. Saint Paul Ball Club, Inc., 251 Minn. 440, 88 N.W.2d 94
(1958) (whether a young boy appreciated the relatively greater danger
of being hit by a foul ball in the seat in which he sat held to be a question
of fact); Schrader v. Kriesel, 232 Minn. 238, 45 N.W.2d 395 (1950); W.
PROSSER, LAw oF TORTS § 67 (3d ed. 1964).
15. Martin v. Des Moines Edison Light Co., 131 Iowa 724, 735, 106
N.W. 359, 363 (1906).16. Id. Although most decisions make no distinction between pri-
mary and secondary assumption of risk, the courts should apply the lat-
ter only when a duty is breached.
17. Trimbo v. Minnesota Valley Natural Gas Co., 260 Minn. 386,
399, 110 N.W.2d 168, 177 (1961) (contributory negligence defined).
18. Parness v. Economics Laboratory, Inc., 284 Minn. 381, 385, 170
N.W.2d 554, 557 (1969); Knutson v. Arrigoni Bros., 275 Minn. 408, 413,
147 N.W.2d 561, 565 (1966); Erickson v. Quarstad 270 Minn. 42, 132
N.W.2d 814 (1964); Schrader v. Kriesel, 232 Minn. 238, 45 N.W.2d 395
(1950); Hubenette v. Ostby, 213 Minn. 349, 6 N.W.2d 637 (1942).
19. In Halpeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368, 378 n.3
(Tex. Sup. Ct. 1963), Justice Greenhill made the following observation:
In preparing Restatement of the Law of Torts, Second, the ad-
visers sharply divided. A group mainly of distinguished deans
and professors- favored striking the entire chapter of Assump-
tion of Risk. They would use contributory negligence. The
group includes Deans Page, Keeton and Wade, and Professors
James, Malone, Morris Seavey, and Thurman. Mr. Eldredge pre-
pared a "dissent" for this group. The group is referred to in the
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scribed the two defenses as "intersecting circles, with consider-
able area in common, where neither excludes the possibility of
the other.'20  Although most courts still recognize the defenses
as separate, several state courts have recently merged secondary
assumption of risk with contributory negligence.2 1
Despite the conceptual distinctions between contributory
negligence and secondary assumption of risk it is not clear that
the latter has a meaning separate and distinct from the former.
The enactment of a comparative negligence statute has made this
examination necessary in Minnesota and other states with similar
statutes for reasons stated by the authors of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts:
There are statutes which make contributory negligence only a
partial defense, with the effect of reducing the recoverable dam-
ages, which have been construed to leave assumption of risk as
a complete defense. It would appear that, unless such a con-
struction is clearly called for, it defeats the intent of the statute
in any case where the same conduct constitutes both contribu-
tory negligence and assumption of risk, since the purpose of the
act would appear to be to reduce the damages in the case of
all such negligent conduct, whatever the defense may be
called.22
Although the existence of the comparative negligence statute un-
derscores the necessity to re-examine the distinctions between the
notes of the draft as "The Confederacy." Others including Pros-
ser, Professor Robert Keeton, and Judges Fee, Flood, Traynor,
and Goodrich supported the existence of the defense of assumed
risk. The distinguished scholars refer to the debate, among
themselves, as "The Battle of the Wilderness." The Reporter,
Prosser, states in the draft that the American Law Institute
voted unanimously to follow the recommendations of the sec-
tions on assumption of risk.
20. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 67 (3d ed. 1964).
21. In Flegner v. Anderson, 375 Mich. 23, 133 N.W.2d 136 (1964),
the court commented:
Similarly we have used assumption of risk in still other cases in
a sense which closely approximates the concepts involved in the
defense of contributory negligence. Some effort has been made
to suggest a rational and valid distinction between assumption
of risk used in this sense and contributory negligence . . . but
such fine distinctions, even if they withstood analysis, which we
doubt, have never been made in any of our cases. ...
Id. at 45, 133 N.W.2d at 148. See also Frelick v. Homeopathic Hospital
Ass'n, 51 Del. 568, 150 A.2d 17 (1959); Bulatao v. Kauai Motors, Ltd.,
49 Hawaii 1, 406 P.2d 887 (1965); Fawcett v. Irby, 92 Idaho 48, 436 P.2d
714 (1968); Parker v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d 586 (Ky. 1967); Baltimore
County v. State, 232 Md. 350, 193 A.2d 30 (1963); Ritter v. Beals, 225
Ore. 504, 358 P.2d 1080 (1961); Siragusa v. Swedish Hosp., 60 Wash. 2d
310, 373 P.2d 767 (1962).
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A, comment d at 562
(1965).
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defenses, the validity or invalidity of the distinctions does not de-
pend upon the existence of such a statute. In fact, with the ex-
ception of Wisconsin, none of the states that have merged the two
defenses have a comparative negligence statute. Therefore, the
analysis of the distinctions for the most part will be independ-
ent of the statutory principles.
Ill. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND
ASSUMPTION OF RISK
The crucial inquiry in determining whether secondary as-
sumption of risk and contributory negligence should remain as
distinct doctrines is whether secondary assumption of risk has a
meaning independent of contributory negligence. If secondary
assumption of risk has no independent application, it should be
properly characterized as a special form of contributory negli-
gence and should be governed by the comparative negligence
statute in the same manner as contributory negligence, i.e., the
defense would only reduce damages and would not completely bar
recovery.
A. THE REASONABLE ASSUmPTION OF RIsK
The Restatement (Second) of Torts takes the position that
secondary assumption of risk may include reasonable conduct by
the plaintiff.23 The key element of secondary assumption of risk
is that the plaintiff must voluntarily encounter a known and
appreciated danger; the reasonableness of his conduct is seem-
ingly irrelevant.2 4 Since by definition contributory negligence
includes only unreasonable conduct,25 it would appear that sec-
ondary assumption of risk has a meaning independent of contribu-
tory negligence in cases where the plaintiffs assumption of a risk
was reasonable. Despite this logical analysis, there are no cases
to support its application. Although in some cases involving pri-
mary assumption of risk the courts have held that reasonable
conduct barred recovery,2 6 no case involving secondary assump-
23. Section 496C defines assumption of risk and annotates the defi-
nition with comment g at 572:
[T]he plaintiff's conduct may be entirely reasonable under the
circumstances; or it may be unreasonable, and so subject him
also to the defense of contributory negligence.
24. Knutson v. Arrigoni Bros., 275 Minn. 408, 413, 147 N.W.2d 561,
565 (1966); Schrader v. Kriesel, 232 Mixn. 238, 247, 45 N.W.2d 395, 400
(1950).
25. See note 17 supra.
26. Stober v. Embry, 243 Ky. 117, 47 S.W.2d 921 (1932); Scanlon v.
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tion of risk has been found in which reasonable conduct has
barred recovery. There are only occasional dicta that secondary
assumption of risk is applicable even though the plaintiff has exer-
cised reasonable care;2 7 and apparently in all the cases involving
the doctrine the conduct of the plaintiff has been unreasonable.2 8
In addition, the effectiveness of a reasonable secondary assump-
tion of risk as a bar to recovery has been challenged by at least
one leading commentator 29 and several courts.3 0  These author-
ities take the position that a reasonable secondary assumption of
risk is a conceptual and practical impossibility, so that in fact
the doctrine's application is limited to situations where the plain-
tiff has acted unreasonably. This, of course, is the same conduct
that gives rise to the defense of contributory negligence.
Wedger, 156 Mass. 462, 31 N.E. 642 (1892); Schlenger v. Weinberg, 107
N.J.L. 130, 150 A. 434 (1930); Klinsky v. Hanson Van Winkle Munning
Co., 38 N.J. Super. 439, 119 A.2d 166 (1955); Johnson v. City of New York,
186 N.Y. 139, 78 N.E. 715 (1906); Dusckiewicz v. Carter, 115 Vt. 122, 52
A.2d 788 (1947); Shafer v. Tacoma Eastern R.R., 91 Wash. 164, 157 P. 485
(1916). In these cases there was clearly no breach of duty; the doc-
trine of primary assumption of risk was applied. The courts held there
was no assumption of risk in three other cases where the defendant golfer
was negligent either in playing prematurely or in failing to shout "fore."
See also Everett v. Goodwin, 201 N.C. 734, 161 S.E. 316 (1931); Slotnick
v. Cooley, 166 Tenn. 373, 61 S.W.2d 462 (1933); Alexander v. Wrenn,
158 Va. 486, 164 S.E. 715 (1932). It would be a strained reading of these
cases to argue that they find reasonable conduct involving secondary as-
sumption of risk to be a bar to recovery.
27. Some courts, including the Minnesota supreme court, have im-
plicitly supported the Restatement position in dicta stating that assump-
tion of risk is distinguishable from contributory negligence because it in-
cludes reasonable conduct or that only an unreasonable assumption of
risk is a form of contributory negligence. The implication is that there
may be a reasonable assumption of risk. See generally Donald v. Moses,
254 Minn. 186, 196, 94 N.W.2d 255, 260 (1959); Schrader v. Kriesel, 232
Minn. 238, 247, 45 N.W.2d 395, 400 (1950); Landrum v. Roddy, 143 Neb.
934, 946, 12 N.W.2d 82, 89 (1943). But see Knutson v. Arrigoni Bros., 275
Minn. 408, 413, 147 N.W.2d 561, 566 (1966), where the court stated that
"[ilt is difficult to see how assumption of risk does not involve a de-
parture from reasonable conduct .... "
28. See, e.g., Aldes v. Saint Paul Ball Club, Inc., 251 Minn. 440, 88
N.W.2d 94 (1958); Standafer v. First Nat'l Bank, 243 Minn. 442, 68
N.W.2d 362 (1955); Landrum v. Roddy, 143 Neb. 934, 12 N.W.2d 82
(1943); Haarmeyer v. Roth, 113 Ohio App. 74, 177 N.E.2d 507 (1960).
29. James, Assumption of Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE
L.J. 185 (1968). This excellent analysis strongly attacks the Restatement
position that a reasonable assumption of risk should bar recovery.
30. Some courts have explicitly stated that only unreasonable con-
duct by the plaintiff will bar recovery if the doctrine of secondary as-
sumption of risk is applied. Fawcett v. Irby, 92 Idaho 48, 436 P.2d 714
(1968); Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d
90 (1959). Such reasoning has led these courts to merge secondary
assumption of risk with contributory negligence.
[Vol. 56:47
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The view of these authorities is preferable for several rea-
sons. First, it is doubtful whether there can be a secondary
assumption of risk that is both reasonable and voluntary; and
since secondary assumption of risk requires voluntary conduct,
the doctrine is not applicable where conduct is involuntary. Ac-
cording to the Restatement, the plaintiffs conduct is not volun-
tary when defendant's tortious conduct has left him no reason-
able alternative in attempting to avoid harm to himself, to avoid
harm to another or to exercise a right or privilege that the de-
fendant has no right to deny him.3 1 In this situation his decision
to encounter the risk is also likely to be reasonable because all
the alternatives are unreasonable. The cases 32 and illustrations 33
cited by the Restatement further support this proposition. It is
doubtful, therefore, that there can be a secondary assumption of
risk that is both reasonable and voluntary.
31. Section 496E. Comment c at 577 states:
The plaintiffs acceptance of the risk is not to be regarded as
voluntary where the defendant's tortious conduct has forced
upon him a choice of courses of conduct, which leaves him no
reasonable alternative to taking his chances. A defendant who
by his own wrong, has compelled the plaintiff to choose between
two evils cannot be permitted to say that the plaintiff is barred
from recovery because he has made the choice. Therefore, where
the defendant is under a duty to the plaintiff, and his breach of
duty compels the plaintiff to encounter the particular risk in or-
der to avert other harm to himself, his acceptance of the risk is
not voluntary, and he is not barred from recovery. The same is
true where the plaintiff is forced to make such a choice in order
to avert harm to a third person. It is true likewise where the
plaintiff is compelled to accept the risk in order to exercise or
protect a right or privilege, of which the defendant has no privi-
lege to deprive him. The existence of an alternative course of
conduct which would avert the harm, or protect the right or
privilege, does not make the plaintiffs choice voluntary, if the
alternative is one which he cannot reasonably be required to
accept.
See also Donald v. Moses, 254 Minn. 186, 94 N.W.2d 255 (1959), where the
court noted that for an assumption of risk to be voluntary there must be
a reasonable alternative.
32. Brandt v. Thompson, 252 S.W.2d 339 (Mo. 1952). Plaintiff suf-
fered injuries when she fell in a poorly lighted stairway in a building
owned by the defendant. She used the steps because the elevator would
not stop on her floor due to its overcrowded condition. The court held
that the plaintiff acted reasonably and that she did not assume the risk
because her actions were involuntary. See also LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chi-
cago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul Ry., 232 U.S. 340 (1914); Donald v. Moses,
254 Minn. 186, 94 N.W.2d 255 (1959); English v. Amidon, 72 N.L 301, 56
A. 548 (1902); Eckert v. Long Island R.R., 43 N.Y. 502 (1871).
33. In the first illustration A negligently set a fire which burned
towards B's house. In order to save his house B attempted to extinguish
the fire, although he knew that there was a risk he might be burned in
doing so. In the second illustration, railroad A negligently failed to give
warning of its train's approach to a crossing and endangered B, a blind
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Second, although the Restatement takes the position that
there may be a reasonable secondary assumption of risk,O' the
cases it cites in support of this point are inconclusive. 8  The
cases involve situations in which either primary, not secondary,
assumption of risk was at issue,5 6 or cases in which the conduct
of the plaintiff was in fact unreasonable. 37 There are signifi-
cant differences between primary and secondary assumption of
risk which make any analogy between them on the question of
reasonable conduct barring recovery incorrect. In primary as-
sumption of risk the conduct of the plaintiff in encountering the
particular risk is irrelevant because he has already assumed the
risk as an incident of his relationship with the defendant, whereas
in secondary assumption of risk that conduct must be carefully
examined. 38  Moreover, in primary assumption of risk the de-
fendant has breached no duty and is not negligent. It is there-
fore logical to allow reasonable conduct to bar recovery, because
the choice is between two non-negligent parties. The loss falls
on the plaintiff because he voluntarily entered into a relation-
ship involving that risk. Such an analysis of secondary assump-
tion of risk, in which the negligence of the defendant is es-
man who was about to cross. Bystander C, in a reasonable effort to save
B, rushed out to the tracks and pushed B out of danger; C was struck and
injured by the train. In both of these illustrations the Restatement con-
cludes that the plaintiff should not be barred from recovery because his
decision to encounter a known risk was not voluntary. Since the utility
of his conduct outweighed the risk involved in both illustrations, the
plaintiff acted reasonably, but his decision to act was not voluntory so he
cannot be barred from recovery by the assumption of risk doctrine.
34. See note 23 supra.
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Appendix § 496C, comment
g at 414 (1966).
36. Stober v. Embry, 243 Ky. 117, 47 S.W.2d 920 (1932); Scanlon v.
Wedger, 156 Mass. 462, 31 N.E. 642 (1892); Schlenger v. Weinberg,
107 N.J.L. 130, 150 A. 434 (1930); Klinsky v. Hanson Van Winkle Mun-
ning Co., 38 N.J. Super. 439, 119 A.2d 166 (1955); Johnson v. City of New
York, 186 N.Y. 139, 78 N.E. 715 (1906); Duskiewicz v. Carter, 115 Vt. 122,
52 A.2d 788 (1947); Shafer v. Tacoma Eastern R.R., 91 Wash. 164, 157
P. 485 (1916).
37. Morton v. California Sports Car Club, 163 Cal. App. 2d 685, 329
P.2d 967 (1958); Mountain p. Wheatley, 106 Cal. App. 2d 333, 234 P.2d
1031 (1951); Bohnsack v. Driftmeier, 243 Iowa 383, 52 N.W.2d 79 (1952).
In these cases the conduct of the plaintiff was clearly unreasonable. In
three other cases cited by the Restatement no assumption of risk was
found at all and therefore the cases cannot be said to support a finding
that a reasonable secondary assumption of risk bars recovery. Everett v.
Goodwin, 201 N.C. 734, 161 S.E. 316 (1931); Slotnick v. Cooley, 166 Tenn.
373, 61 S.W.2d 462 (1933); Alexander v. Wrenn, 158 Va. 486, 164 S.E. 715
(1932).
38. See text accompanying notes 3-21 supra.
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tablished, would not be correct. This idea was well-expressed by
the New Jersey court in Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions,
Inc.:39
[A]lthough it would be technically accurate with respect to as-
sumption of risk in its primary sense to say that plaintiff as-
sumed the risk of non-negligent injury even though he was free
of fault, the same instruction, if given where assumption of
risk in its secondary sense is in issue, would lead to the ex-
culpation of a negligent defendant upon the erroneous notion that
a plaintiff assumed the risk of that negligence even though he
was free of blame.40
Cases applying this doctrine of primary assumption of risk there-
fore should not be used to support the proposition that a reason-
able secondary assumption of risk should bar recovery. Since
the cases cited by the Restatement are of this type, or are
cases in which the conduct of the plaintiff was unreasonable,
these authorities do not support the proposition that reason-
able conduct may constitute secondary assumption of risk.
Third, it is unjustifiable from a policy viewpoint to allow rea-
sonable conduct to bar recovery in a state that has recently en-
acted a comparative negligence statute. The effect of allowing
reasonable conduct to bar recovery from a negligent defendant
is to punish reasonable conduct. Several courts in states without
comparative negligence statutes recently have recognized that
only unreasonable conduct by the plaintiff should bar his recov-
ery once the negligence of the defendant has been established.41
In Bulatao v. Kauai Motors42 the court declined to transplant
into areas other than master-servant relationships the secondary
assumption of risk doctrine "that one who knew (or should have
known) of a negligently created risk is barred even though free
of fault, i.e., even though a reasonably prudent man would have
incurred the risk despite that knowledge. '4 3 This logic is even
more compelling in a state where comparative negligence princi-
ples allow even a plaintiff whose conduct is unreasonable to
recover as long as his negligence is less than that of the defend-
ant. It would be inconsistent with this loss distribution system
to deny a reasonable plaintiff recovery solely because his conduct
can be labeled as assumption of risk. Therefore, it appears un-
39. 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959).
40. Id. at 50, 155 A.2d at 94.
41. Fawcett v. Irby, 92 Idaho 48, 436 P.2d 714 (1968); Meistrich v.
Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959).
42. 49 Hawaii 1, 406 P.2d 887 (1965).
43. Id. at 14-15, 406 P.2d at 894.
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justifiable to allow a reasonable secondary assumption of risk to
bar recovery in Minnesota.
The argument that secondary assumption of risk has a mean-
ing independent of contributory negligence because it includes
reasonable conduct of the plaintiff is thus without basis. If sec-
ondary assumption of risk bars recovery only when plaintiff's
conduct is unreasonable, then contributory negligence and as-
sumption of risk are merely two ways of describing the same
conduct, and secondary assumption of risk is merely a form of
contributory negligence. As a result, there is little doubt that
it should fall within the scope of the comparative negligence stat-
ute. The key question then becomes whether the plaintiff exer-
cised reasonable care. If he did, he should be allowed to recover;
if he did not, the comparative negligence statute should be ap-
plicable and his recovery diminished in proportion to his own
negligence.
B. MINNESOTA DECISIONS
Minnesota decisions construing the doctrines of contributory
negligence and secondary assumption of risk are inconclusive,
reflecting the general state of confusion elsewhere. There is sub-
stantial authority in Minnesota to support the proposition that an
unreasonable secondary assumption of risk is merely a form of
contributory negligence.44 In Hubenette v. Ostby 45 the court
made the following observation:
In the ordinary personal injury action, where plaintiff puts him-
self in a position to encounter known hazards which the ordinar-
ily prudent person would not do, he assumes the risk of injury
therefrom. Such assumption of risk is but a phase of contribu-
tory negligence and is properly included within the scope of that
term.46
Lest that and similar opinions be construed as merging the two
defenses, the court made it clear in Schrader v. Kriese147 that it
believed there were important differences between the two de-
fenses:
44. Schrader v. Kriesel, 232 Minn. 238, 247, 45 N.W.2d 395, 400
(1966); Standafer v. First National Bank, 243 Minn. 442, 68 N.W. 2d 362
(1955); Swenson v. Slawik, 236 Minn. 403, 410, 53 N.W.2d 107, 111
(1952); Johnson v. Evanski, 221 Minn. 323, 22 N.W.2d 213 (1946);
Schroepfer v. City of Sleepy Eye, 215 Minn. 525, 532, 10 N.W.2d 398, 402
(1943) (instruction on contributory negligence held to include assump-
tion of risk within its scope).
45. 213 Minn. 349, 6 N.W.2d 637 (1942).
46. Id. at 350, 6 N.W.2d at 638.
47. 232 Minn. 238, 45 N.W.2d 395 (1950).
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[M]aterial distinctions do exist between contributory negligence
and assumption of risk .... There is often, as here, a regret-
table tendency to blur these distinctions, and we wish to make
it clear that those cases in which this court has held assumption
of risk to be a phase of contributory negligence are not to be con-
strued as merging the two defenses .... 48
The court, however, went on to admit that when a secondary
assumption of risk is unreasonable, it does become a phase of con-
tributory negligence. 49
One distinction occasionally mentioned by Minnesota courts
is that secondary assumption of risk is a subjective test requiring
actual knowledge of the danger while contributory negligence is
an objective test requiring the knowledge of a reasonable man.5 0
This distinction is susceptible to two arguments. First, it is more
conceptual than real. This fact has been recognized by several
courts and commentators5 and was particularly well-expressed
by one writer:
[S]uch a distinction is not particularly helpful .... How is the
trier of fact to distinguish between subjective and objective
knowledge? Unless the plaintiff admits that he knew of and
appreciated the risk, the only way for the jury to decide whether
or not he did is to consider the facts of the case and credibility
of witnesses. The jury cannot consider these circumstances
from the plaintiff's subjective point of view, but rather must
view these circumstances objectively in retrospect. Viewing
these circumstances retrospectively, it is unlikely that the jury
would be able to distinguish between what the plaintiff ac-
tually knew and what he should have known.52
If as a practical matter, the distinction between what the plain-
48. Id. at 248, 45 N.W.2d at 400.
49. Id.
50. Parness v. Economics Laboratory, Inc., 284 Minn. 381, 170
N.W.2d 554 (1969) (referring to assumption of risk as a subjective test
and contributory negligence as an objective test); Knutson v. Arrigoni
Bros., 275 Minn. 408, 413, 147 N.W.2d 561, 565 (1966) (assumption of risk
may be invoked only where it appears that the hazard is known to the
actor or so plainly observable that he is charged with knowledge of it);
Swenson v. Slawik, 236 Minn. 403, 410, 53 N.W.2d 107, 111 (1952) (con-
tributory negligence is not established unless a reasonably prudent per-
son in the exercise of ordinary care would know that use of premises with
defective condition would be dangerous); Schrader v. Kriesel, 232 Minn.
238, 247, 45 N.W.2d 395, 400 (1950) (knowledge and appreciation of the
danger are indispensible to assumption of risk); Rase v. Minneapolis,
St.Paul and S.Ste. Marie Ry., 107 Minn. 260, 267, 120 N.W. 360, 364 (1909)
(doctrine of assumption of risk rests on intelligent acquiescence with
knowledge of the danger and appreciation of the risks).
51. See, e.g., Fawcett v. Irby, 92 Idaho 48, 55, 436 P.2d 714, 721
(1968); Parker v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d 586, 591 (Ky. 1967); Rice, The
Automobile Guest and the Rationale of Assumption of Risk, 27 MINN. L.
REv. 323, 340 (1943).
52. Comment, Distinction Between Assumption of Risk and Con-
tributory Negligence in Wisconsin, 1960 Wis. L. REv. 460, 466.
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tiff knew and what he should have known is virtually impossible
to draw, it is certainly of no value as a method of distinguishing
between the two doctrines.
A second argument against this subjective-objective distinc-
tion is that it does not provide a distinction between secondary as-
sumption of risk and contribuory negligence. The plainiff must
have knowledge of the risk before his subsequent conduct in en-
countering it can be considered unreasonable. The subjective test
(assumption of risk) requires that the plaintiff have actual knowl-
edge of the risk, while the objective test (contributory negli-
gence) requires that he be charged with the knowledge of a rea-
sonable man in addition to the knowledge he actually had. Under
any circumstances where it could be determined that the plaintiff
had actual knowledge of the risk, any inquiry as to what knowl-
edge he should have had as a reasonable man is not necessary.
The result of actual knowledge is that any unreasonable conduct
subsequent to encountering the risk may be either contributory
negligence or secondary assumption of risk. On the other hand, if
it is found that plaintiff did not have actual knowledge of the
risk, then inquiry as to what knowledge he should have had is
is relevant. If it is found that he should have had knowledge of
the risk, then his subsequent unreasonable decision to encounter
it is only contributory negligence; it cannot be secondary as-
sumption of risk, because he did not have actual knowledge of the
danger. The conclusion from the above reasoning is that when
the jury can find assumption of risk, it can also find contributory
negligence, even though the reverse is not true. Since contribu-
tory negligence can be found wherever assumption of risk can be
found, the subjective-objective distinction does not give second-
ary assumption of risk any meaning independent of contributory
negligence.
A number of Minnesota cases support this conclusion. "  In
Parness v. Economics Laboratory, Inc., 54 the court held that if the
jury found plaintiff had assumed the risk from a subjective view-
point, it must then also find the plaintiff contributorily negligent.
53. Knutson v. Arrigoni Bros. 275 Minn. 408, 413, 147 N.W.2d 561,
565 (1966) (contributory negligence but not assumption of risk allowed
to go to the jury because it was found that plaintiff did not have knowl-
edge of the danger); Erickson v. Quarstad, 270 Minn. 42, 132 N.W.2d 814
(1964) (both contributory negligence and assumption of risk found as a
matter of law); Swenson v. Slawik, 236 Minn. 403, 410, 53 N.W.2d 107, 111
(1952).
54. 284 Minn. 381, 170 N.W.2d 554 (1969).
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On the other hand, the court held that the jury could find that
even though the plaintiff did not assume the risk she could be
contributorily negligent. Thus the Minnesota court has recog-
nized that the subjective-objective distinction provides no basis
for an argument that secondary assumption of risk has a mean-
ing independent of contributory negligence, but only that con-
tributory negligence may exist in some circumstances where the
stricter subjective standards of secondary assumption of risk
are not met.
The Minnesota supreme court has drawn another distinction
in frequent statements to the effect that secondary assumption of
risk differs from contributory negligence by being the exercise
of an intelligent choice. 55 The thrust of this argument is that
contributory negligence is careless conduct while secondary as-
sumption of risk is voluntary conduct. For the most part this
argument is an assertion that assumption of risk includes reason-
able conduct by the plaintiff and is, therefore, independent of
contributory negligence. This argument has been discussed
above,56 and it is of little utility in establishing an independent
meaning for assumption of risk. When the decision to encounter
a risk is an unreasonable one, it is careless despite the fact that it
may be voluntary. Voluntary conduct may clearly be classified
as careless when the risk would not have been taken by a reason-
ably prudent man. Therefore, this distinction, as well as the
subjective-objective distinction, provides only that voluntary, un-
reasonable conduct by the plaintiff may be labeled as assumption
of risk as well as contributory negligence.
Several Minnesota cases follow this analysis. In Schroepfer
v. City of Sleepy Eye,57 the plaintiff's decedent was electrocuted
by high tension wires. Defendant contended that the plaintiff was
contributorily negligent and had assumed the risk, because he
knew the wires were dangerous and yet deliberately placed his
hand on them. The court held that both assumption of risk and
contributory negligence could go to the jury under the same in-
struction, because the substance of the contributory negligence
instruction also covered assumption of risk-58 In Standafer v.
55. Knutson v. Arrigoni Bros. 275 Minn. 408, 413, 147 N.W.2d 561,
565 (1966); Standafer v. First National Bank, 243 Minn. 442, 448, 68
N.W.2d 362, 365 (1955); Schrader v. Kriesel, 232 Minn. 238, 247, 45 N.W.2d
395, 400 (1950).
56. See text accompanying notes 23-43 supra.
57. 215 Minn. 525, 10 N.W.2d 398 (1943).
58. Id. at 53, 10 N.W.2d at 403. The instruction reads as follows:
If a person recklessly exposes himself to known or imminent
1971]
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First National Bank"9 the decedent knew of an open elevator
shaft but walked backward and fell into it. After stating that
assumption of risk is the exercise of an intelligent choice and that
contributory negligence is based on carelessness, the court al-
lowed both issues to go to the jury, because it was not certain
either that the decedent had the requisite knowledge or that he
had acted unreasonably. In Wright v. City of St. Cloud ° plaintiff
was injured when she fell on an icy sidewalk. The court found
that she recognized the dangerous condition of the walk but vol-
untarily chose to walk on it, and barred recovery because of her
contributory negligence, but noted that assumption of risk was
also applicable.0 It is apparent therefore, that the voluntary-
careless distinction does not give assumption of risk a meaning
independent from contributory negligence, either because volun-
tary but unreasonable conduct constitutes contributory negli-
gence, or because that distinction, as well as secondary assump-
tion of risk, demonstrates only that when careless conduct is vol-
untary it may also be labeled secondary assumption of risk.
Development of the assumption of risk doctrine in Minnesota
has been essentially an adjunct to contributory negligence. Many
cases, including those which make the above distinctions, have in-
dicated that an unreasonable assumption of risk is merely a form
of contributory negligence.6 2  The distinctions the court has
drawn are inadequate because they fail to give secondary assump-
tion of risk any meaning independent of contributory negligence.
Instead, they demonstrate only that contributory negligence is a
broader concept than secondary assumption of risk, and the
court has consistently found that conduct by a plaintiff may con-
stitute either contributory negligence or secondary assumption of
risk.63
danger, unnecessarily, in a manner that a person of ordinary care
would not do under the circumstances, he assumes the risk of
such danger and is guilty of contributory negligence and can-
not recover for any injuries sustained by him under such cir-
cumstances, and the same rule applies if some other person
brings suit for his death.
59. 243 Minn. 442, 68 N.W.2d 362 (1955).
60. 54 Minn. 94, 55 N.W.819 (1893).
61. Id. at 98, 55 N.W. at 821.
62. In Knutson v. Arrigoni Bros., 275 Minn. 408, 411, 147 N.W.2d 561,
565 (1966), the court notes that assumption of risk involves a departure
from reasonable conduct and in that limited sense it may be a phase of
contributory negligence. See also Standafer v. First National Bank, 243
Minn. 442, 448, 68 N.W.2d 362, 365 (1955); Schrader v. Kriesel, 232 Minn.
238, 247, 45 N.W.2d 395, 400 (1950).
63. Parness v. Economics Laboratory, Inc., 284 Minn. 381, 170 N.W.
2d 554 (1969); Erickson v. Quarstad, 270 Minn. 42, 132 N.W.2d 815 (1964);
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C. SECONDARY ASSUMPTION OF RISK SHOULD BE E umIAmD
It is apparent from the above analysis that secondary as-
sumption of risk is a duplication of contributory negligence and
should not be recognized as a separate defense. A leading com-
mentator 64 has advocated this course, and several courts have
recently chosen to follow it. The case which apparently initiated
this trend is Meistric v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc.65 There
the New Jersey court examined the historical origins of the doc-
trine and concluded that secondary assumption of risk was never
intended to bar recovery if the conduct of the plaintiff was rea-
sonable.6 6 Since secondary assumption of risk then would bar re-
covery only when plaintiff's conduct was unreasonable, the court
came to this conclusion:
Hence we think it clear that assumption of risk in its secondary
sense is a mere phase of contributory negligence, the total
issue being whether a reasonably prudent man in the exercise
of due care (a) would have incurred the known risk and (b)
if he would, whether such a person in the light of all the circum-
stances including the appreciated risk could have conducted
himself in the manner in which plaintiff acted.67
In Flegner v. Anderson,68 a thorough and well-reasoned opinion,
the Michigan supreme court examined the historical roots of as-
sumption of risk. It noted several cases where assumption of
risk had been applied to relieve a defendant of liability on the
theory that the plaintiff assumed the risk of injuries from the de-
fendant's negligent acts.6 9 The Michigan court commented that
these cases confused assumption of risk with contributory negli-
gence when there was no need to engraft concepts of assumption
of risk on to contributory negligence, and held that assumption of
risk is of "no utility in barring recovery where the defendant has
been found to have negligently breached a duty owed to the
Standafer v. First Nat'l Bank, 243 Minn. 442, 68 N.W.2d 362 (1944);
Schroepfer v. City of Sleepy Eye, 215 Minn. 525, 10 N.W.2d 398 (1943).
64. James, supra note 29; 2 F. HAnPFR & F. JAMES, LAw OF ToRis
§ 21.8 (1956).
65. 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959). The Meistrich case was subse-
quently reaffirmed in McGrath v. American Cyanamid Co., 41 N.J. 272,
196 A.2d 238 (1963). After reviewing Meistrich the court concluded with
this admonition:
Experience ... indicates the term "assumption of risk" is so apt
to create mist that it is better banished from the scene. We hope
we have heard the last of it. Henceforth let us stay with "negli-
gence" and "contributory negligence."
66. 31 N.J. at 50, 155 A.2d at 94.
67. Id. at 54, 155 A.2d at 95.
68. 375 Mich. 23, 133 N.W.2d 136 (1965).
69. Id. at 45, 133 N.W.2d at 147.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
plaintiff. '70 In Siragusa v. Swedish Hospital7' the Washing-
ton court held that if an employer breaches his duty of furnishing
his employees with a safe place to work, an employee is not
barred from recovery merely because he was aware of the dan-
gerous condition. If the employee's voluntary exposure to the
risk was unreasonable, he would be barred from recovery be-
cause of contributory negligence and not because of secondary
assumption of risk. The rationale of the Siragusa opinion is that
reasonable conduct by the plaintiff should not bar recovery even
though it amounts to secondary assumption of risk. Courts in
Delaware, 72 Hawaii, 73 Idaho, 74 Kentucky, 75 Maryland 70 and Ore-
gon 77 have also chosen to eliminate secondary assumption of risk.
The argument against secondary assumption of risk is rein-
forced by a comparative negligence statute.78  Formerly it did
not matter in practice whether the particular conduct of the
plaintiff was labeled as secondary assumption of risk or contribu-
tory negligence because both were complete bars to recovery;
but under a comparative negligence statute, if plaintiff's conduct
constitutes both contributory negligence and secondary assump-
70. Id. at 56, 133 N.W.2d at 153.
71. 60 Wash. 2d 310, 373 P.2d 767 (1962).
72. Frelick v. Homeopathic Hospital Ass'n, 51 Del. 568, 150 A.2d 17
(1959). The court held that when risk is created by defendant's breach of
duty to the plaintiff, the problem of voluntary, secondary assumption
of risk is an included portion of contributory negligence such that the two
defenses should be considered as one.
73. Bulatao v. Kauai Motors, Ltd., 49 Hawaii 1, 406 P.2d 887 (1965).
The court refused to use the secondary assumption of risk doctrine to
bar recovery where the plaintiff had acted reasonably. It concluded
that since there is no distinguishing feature whereby it would have a
different application from contributory negligence, there was no need
to invoke both defenses where one was sufficient.
74. Fawcett v. Irby, 92 Idaho 48, 436 P.2d 714 (1968). The court
held that since secondary assumption of risk bars recovery only when
the conduct of the plaintiff is unreasonable, the defense should be abol-
ished and merged with contributory negligence.
75. Parker v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d 586 (Ky. 1967). The court noted
that "qualified" assumption of risk bars recovery only when plaintiff's
conduct is unreasonable and then stated that the distinctions between
secondary assumption of risk and contributory negligence are not signifi-
cant enough to warrant retaining assumption of risk as a separate doc-
trine.
76. Baltimore County v. State, 232 Md. 350, 193 A.2d 30 (1963).
77. Ritter v. Beals, 225 Ore. 504, 358 P.2d 1080 (1961). After stating
that everything in connection with the plaintiff's conduct can be sub-
mitted on a pleading of contributory negligence, the court appropriately
noted that only confusion is added when secondary assumption of risk is
introduced.
78. MINN. STAT. § 604.01, Subd. 1 (1969).
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tion of risk,7 9 the defendant can circumvent the statute entirely
by asserting the assumption of risk defense in jurisdictions where
assumption of risk remains separate from contributory negli-
gence. This approach would defeat the statutory purpose alto-
gether by disallowing even partial recovery to a plaintiff whose
negligence is less than that of the defendant. This anamolous re-
sult can be avoided only by recognizing that secondary assump-
tion of risk is essentially only a narrow form of contributory neg-
ligence and should be merged with it.80
IV. THE WISCONSIN EXAMPLE
A. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE Two STATUTES
In 1931 Wisconsin adopted a comparative negligence stat-
ute8 l similar to Minnesota's. It is therefore instructive to com-
pare the two statutes and to examine the Wisconsin decisions con-
struing its application to secondary assumption of risk.
The operative part of the Minnesota comparative negligence
statute 2 concerning contributory negligence is a verbatim copy
of the Wisconsin statute.8 3 Legislative history is sparse, but a
memorandum to the senate counsel from his assistant while the
statute was in its formative stages clearly indicates that the
Minnesota statute was adopted from Wisconsin. 84 A presump-
79. White v. McVicker, 216 Iowa 90, 246 N.W. 385 (1933); Parness
v. Economics Laboratory, 284 Minn. 381, 170 N.W.2d 554 (1969); Ganser
v. Erickson, 279 Minn. 235, 156 N.W.2d 224 (1968); Tatro v. Carlson,
271 Minn. 536, 137 N.W.2d 187 (1965); Erickson v. Quarstad, 270 Minn.
42, 132 N.W.2d 814 (1964); Haarmeyer v. Roth, 113 Ohio App. 74, 177
N.E.2d 507 (1960).
80. Dictum in Parness v. Economic Laboratory, Inc., 284 Minn. 381,
386, 170 N.W.2d 554, 558 (1969), implicitly recognized that as a result of
the comparative negligence statute, secondary assumption of risk should
be abolished. The court stated that while it acknowledged the persua-
siveness of plaintiffs argument that secondary assumption of risk be
abolished, the argument would be more appropriately presented under
the comparative negligence statute.
81. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 331.045 (1958):
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by
any person or his legal representative to recover damages for
negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property,
if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the per-
son against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed
shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to the person recovering.
82. See note 1 supra.
83. See note 81 supra.
84. UNIVERSITY Or MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION, MINNESOTA CoMPARATIvE NEGLIGENCE LAW 11 (1969). AS-
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tion is thereby raised that Minnesota adopted the Wisconsin
statute with the construction placed on it by the courts of that
state at the time of the adoption.8 5
B. THE WISCONSIN INTERPRETATION
Wisconsin has always limited the application of assumption of
risk to cases in which there is at least a "consensual" relation-
ship,8 6 i.e., a relationship entered into voluntarily by both par-
ties.17 Thus the doctrine of assumption of risk in Wisconsin has
no application to actions between strangers, and its primary ap-
plication has been in automobile guest cases. Both primary and
secondary assumption of risk doctrines have been applied depend-
ing upon the particular circumstances of each case. In automo-
bile guest cases the host owes a duty to the guest to use ordinary
care not to increase the dangers inherent in the condition of
the car or as a result of the skill or judgment of the host driver.88
In Cleary v. Eckardt,89 the court indicated that the host need ex-
ercise only the skill he actually possessed and that if he conscien-
tiously exercised his best skill he violated no duty to the guest
even though his skill was less than that of a reasonably prudent
man.90 Thus the guest was forced to assume the risk of travel
sistant Senate Counsel Robert Duckstad made the following comment in
a memo to Senate Counsel H. Blair Klein: "The bill [comparative negli-
gence statute] is a verbatim copy of the Wisconsin statute." In the
balance of the publication, which explains how the Minnesota statute is
intended to operate, there are frequent references to the Wisconsin stat-
ute.
85. Nicollet Nat'l Bank v. City Bank, 38 Minn. 85, 88, 35 N.W. 577,
579 (1887) where the Minnesota supreme court enunciated the following
canon of statutory construction:
It is a well-recognized principle that where a statute, the con-
struction of which has been judicially determined, has been
adopted into the statute law of another state, a presumption
arises ... that the legislature adopted the statute with that
settled construction.
This principle has since been reaffirmed in Minnesota Baptist Cony.
v. Pillsbury Acad., 246 Minn. 46, 76 N.W.2d 286 (1955). The relation-
ship between the two comparative negligence statutes was discussed in
Olson v. Hartwig, 288 Minn. 375, 180 N.W.2d 870 (1970), where the
Minnesota court concluded that the Wisconsin statute had been adopted
in Minnesota as it had been construed by the Wisconsin supreme court
prior to its adoption.
86. Schiro v. Oriental Realty Co., 272 Wis. 537, 76 N.W.2d 355 (1956).
87. Switzer v. Weiner, 230 Wis. 509, 284 N.W. 509 (1939).
88. Wheeler v. Rural Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 261 Wis. 528, 53 N.W.2d 190
(1952); Haugen v. Wittkopf, 242 Wis. 276, 278, 7 N.W.2d 886, 887 (1943);
O'Shea v. Lavoy, 176 Wis. 456, 185 N.W. 525 (1921).
89. 191 Wis. 114, 210 N.W. 267 (1926).
90. Id. at 118, 210 N.W. at 269.
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arising from the personal habits of the driver, although this rule
was later qualified by the requirement that the guest have
knowledge of those personal characteristics.9' When the doc-
trine of secondary assumption of risk was applied in Wisconsin
the courts required, in addition to a consensual relationship, that
the plaintiff have knowledge of the particular danger involved
and make a voluntary decision to encounter it."2
The rule of these cases, however, was made obsolete by the
decision in McConville v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.
Co. 9 3 In that case the jury found that the defendant had been
negligent and the plaintiff contributorily negligent. The lower
court held that recovery was completely barred, however, be-
cause it was found that plaintiff had assumed the risk of defend-
ant's negligent operation of the motor vehicle. The Wisconsin su-
preme court reversed and adopted the following rules of law:
(1) The driver of an automobile owes his guest the same duty
of ordinary care that he owes to others;
(2) A guest's assumption of risk, heretofore implied from his
willingness to proceed in the face of a known hazard, is
no longer a defense separate from contributory negli-
gence;
(3) If a guest's exposure of himself to a particular hazard be
unreasonable and a failure to exercise ordinary care for
his own safety, such conduct is negligence, and is subject
to the comparative negligence statute.94
When he [the guest] accepts the invitation and enters the au-
tomobile does he not accept the car in the condition in which it
exists and such skill as may be possessed on the part of the
driver? That there is a great variation in the degree of skill
possessed by those who assume to drive cars is well known.
Not all who drive automobiles by any manner of means can be
said to be expert drivers. The danger thus assumed is that the
danger should not be increased and to which the host should
add no new danger. If the host driving the car conscientiously
exercised the skill possessed by him ... does the guest have a
right to demand any more? Does the guest have a right to de-
mand of the host a degree of skill for the security of the guest
which the host is utterly unable to exercise for his own pro-
tection? It would seem that the statement of this question car-
ried with it its own answer, and that the same consideration
which compels the guest to accept the car in the condition in
which he finds it also compels him to be content with the honest
and conscientious exercise of such skill as the host or driver may
have attained ....
91. Forecki v. Kohlberg, 237 Wis. 67, 295 N.W. 7 (1941).
92. Topel v. Correz, 273 Wis. 611, 79 N.W.2d 253 (1956); Muh'en-
beck v. Fitchett, 270 Wis. 373, 71 N.W.2d 293 (1955); Egan v. Wege, 260
Wis. 118, 50 N.W.2d 457 (1951); Scory v. Lafave, 215 Wis. 21, 254 N.W. 643
(1934); Biersach v. Wechselberg, 206 Wis. 113, 238 N.W. 905 (1931).
93. 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962).
94. Id. at 378, 113 N.W.2d at 16.
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The court stated that if the guest's willingness to proceed in the
face of a known hazard is reasonable, such acquiescence would
constitute no defense. 95 Implied consent derived from plaintiff's
acquiescence in defendant's negligence was deemed to be no long-
er satisfactory as a basis for retaining the doctrine of assumption
of risk.96 The court noted that a limitation on the duty a host
owes his guest is no longer consistent with sound public policy in
an age when modern, powerful vehicles are capable of inflicting
serious injury.97
Subsequent Wisconsin decisions have applied and expanded
the McConville rule. In Colson v. Rule,98 a farm laborer sued
his employer after a scaffolding on which he was standing col-
lapsed. The evidence indicated that his employer had told him
that the scaffolding was unsafe. The court applied the McCon-
ville rule and determined that the employee had been contribu-
torily negligent. It observed that:
Another reason for changing the existing rule is the difficulty in
drawing a dividing line between assumption of risk and con-
tributory negligence .... The attempted distinction between
assumption of risk and contributory negligence is highly tech-
nical and in many fact situations it is difficult for the trial
courts to distinguish between the two. Yet, if assumption of
risk is an absolute defense under the comparative negligence
statute, while contributory negligence is not, it is essential that
trial courts attempt to define the same in instructing juries
where assumption of risk is pleaded as a defense.99
Thus the McConville rule was extended to situations other than
automobile guest cases. That the rule is to be applied in all situ-
ations where alleged assumption of risk arises by implication was
made clear in Gilson v. Drees Brothers, o00 where the court stated:
The policy reasons which prompted the court to abrogate the
doctrine of assumption of risk as an absolute defense in those
cases [McConville and Colson] do no apply with comparable
clarity in the instant case. However, it is our opinion that
greater fairness will result if the claimed negligence of [the
plaintiff] is couched in terms of contributory negligence rather
than assumption of risk. This will be true whenever the al-
leged assumption of risk arises by implication, as here, as op-
posed to an express assumption of a known risk. This would
serve to extend the rule adopted in the McConville and Colson
cases to all situations involving the tacit assumption of risk.10'
95. Id. at 379, 113 N.W.2d at 17.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 382, 113 N.W.2d at 19.
98. 15 Wis. 2d 387, 113 N.W.2d 21 (1962).
99. Id. at 390, 113 N.W.2d at 22.
100. 19 Wis. 2d 252, 120 N.W.2d 63 (1963).
101. Id. at 258, 120 N.W.2d at 67.
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It appears, therefore, that secondary assumption of risk in Wis-
consin is dead.
It is likely, however, that primary assumption of risk and,
certainly, express assumption of risk'02 remain. McConville, Col-
son and Gilson all involved secondary assumption of risk, in
which defendant's negligence was established and plaintiffs as-
sumption of risk was implied from his willingness to proceed in
the face of a known danger. The above language in Colson and
GiLson 103 indicates that the Wisconsin court eliminated secondary
assumption of risk only when it was a measure of plaintiff's con-
duct and when it overlapped contributory negligence. This re-
sult will obtain only when the secondary assumption of risk doc-
trine is applied. Although McConville did discuss the duty of host
to guest, it did so only to eliminate the outmoded idea promul-
gated in Cleary v. Eckhardt 04 that the duty of the host to his
guest was less than reasonable care, and this abrogation was ef-
fected for policy reasons peculiar to the automobile host-guest re-
lationship. Certainly the purpose of such language was not to
extend the duty of baseball park owners or persons in possession
of premises. Therefore, the status of the doctrine of assumption
of risk in Wisconsin is similar to its position in other states which
recently have chosen to remove secondary assumption of risk as
a bar to recovery for negligently caused damages.0 5 Undoubt-
edly, the existence of a comparative negligence statute was a
significant influence.
As emphasized earlier, Minnesota presumptively adopted the
Wisconsin comparative negligence statute as construed by the
courts prior to its adoption in Minnesota.'"0  Since it is clear that
the Wisconsin courts have interpreted the Wisconsin statute to in-
102. Express assumption of risk is a form of primary assumption of
risk. Express assumption occurs when two parties contractually agree
to limit the duties and liabilities of one party, e.g., an innkeeper con-
tractually agrees with his guest that he is not liable for lost or stolen
items.
103. See text accompanying notes 99 & 101 supra.
104. See note 90 supra.
105. Frelick v. Homeopathic Hospital Ass'n, 31 Del. 268, 150 A.2d 17
(1959); Bulatao v. Kauai Motors, Ltd., 49 Hawaii 1, 406 P.2d 887 (1965);
Fawcell v. Irby, 92 Idaho 48, 436 P.2d 714 (1968); Parker v. Redden, 421
S.W.2d 586 (Ky. 1967); Baltimore County v. State, 232 Md. 350, 193
A.2d 30 (1963); Flegner v. Anderson, 375 Mich. 23, 133 N.W.2d 136 (1965);
Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959);
Ritter v. Beals, 225 Ore. 504, 358 P.2d 1080 (1961); Siragusa v. Swedish
Hosp. 60 Wash. 2d 310, 373 P.2d 767 (1962).
106. See text accompanying notes 86-90 supra.
19711
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
clude secondary assumption of risk within its scope, this inter-
pretation should be followed by the Minnesota courts.
V. OTHER STATES WITH COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE STATUTES
Seven other states besides Minnesota and Wisconsin have
comparative negligence statutes.10 7 The comparative negligence
statutes of those states, however, are not verbatim copies of the
Wisconsin statute, nor is there any indication that Minnesota in-
tended to adopt any of them. As a result the interpretations of
those statutes are not as relevant as the interpretation of the
Wisconsin statute. Nonetheless, it is desirable to determine
whether those states have interpreted their statutes so as to in-
clude the secondary assumption of risk doctrine within their
scope.
Most of the statutes are sufficiently recent that the courts
have not yet faced this issue. In Mississippi, however, the su-
preme court has allowed assumption of risk to continue as a de-
fense separate from contributory negligence. In Saxton v.
Rose,10 8 plaintiff's intestate was killed while riding as a passenger
in defendant's truck. The evidence indicated that the defendant
was intoxicated. Plaintiff was denied recovery because the de-
cedent was held to have assumed the risk when he voluntarily
rode with the defendant knowing that defendant was intoxicated.
The court distinguished this case from an earlier one which held
similar conduct by the plaintiff to be contributory negligence on
the basis that in Saxton the passenger did not actively participate
in procuring the defendant to drive recklessly.10 The opinion
went on to note that the common law doctrine of assumption of
risk is in "full force" 0 in Mississippi. There was no direct
reference to the comparative negligence statute.
The reasoning and result in this case, perhaps more than in
any other, emphasize the injustice of allowing assumption of risk
to continue as a complete bar to recovery after the adoption of a
comparative negligence statute. Apparently the rule in Missis-
sippi now is that one who sits passively while the defendant
drives recklessly is completely barred from recovery because he
has assumed the risk, while one who actively encourages the de-
107. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27.1730.1 (1962); GA. CODE ANN. § 94-703
108. 201 Miss. 814, 29 So. 2d 646 (1947).
109. Watson v. Holiman, 169 Miss. 585, 153 So. 669 (1934).
110. Saxton v. Rose, 201 Miss. 814, 823, 29 So. 2d 646, 649 (1947).
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fendant's reckless conduct may be granted partial recovery be-
cause he is contributorily negligent. A more anomalous result
could not be reached.
The Nebraska court, at least by implication, has discussed the
effect its comparative negligence statute should have on as-
sumption of risk In Landrum v. Roddy, 1 ' the plaintiff was
injured as a result of defendant's negligent driving. Plaintiff
knew that defendant had been drinking and had several op-
portunities to leave the car after she had gained that knowl-
edge. It would seem that those facts presented a classic case
of secondary assumption of risk since the plaintiff had vol-
untarily chosen to encounter a known danger. Nonetheless, the
court refused to characterize plaintiff's conduct as such and la-
beled it contributory negligence, which gave her the benefit of
the comparative negligence statute. Although this result suggests
a merger of the two defenses, the court emphasized throughout
the decision that there were distinctions between the two de-
fenses despite the fact that they often overlap. The disinction
in this case of deliberateness as opposed to carelessness implies
that plaintiff's conduct may be labeled as secondary assumption
of risk. Nonetheless, the court chose to label it contributory neg-
ligence. The vitality of secondary assumption of risk as a defense
in Nebraska is therefore unclear.
VI. CONCLUSION
Contributory negligence and secondary assumption of risk
are both affirmative defenses based on the conduct of the plaintiff.
The Minnesota comparative negligence statute disposes of con-
tributory negligence, but is silent as to assumption of risk. Since
secondary assumption of risk has litttle meaning or application in-
dependent of contributory negligence, it should be considered a
special form of contributory negligence and should thus fall
within the scope of the statute. The major premise underlying
the theory that secondary assumption of risk is separate and dis-
tinct from contributory negligence is that it includes reasonable
conduct by the plaintiff. This argument is not persuasive since
it results from a misreading of the historical origins of assump-
tion of risk, fails to acknowledge that a reasonable decision to
encounter a known risk is often involuntary and is inconsistent
with the fault system of loss distribution in that it denies re-
covery to a plaintiff who acted reasonably even though the
111. 143 Neb. 934, 12 N.W.2d 82 (1943).
1971]
72 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:47
fault of the defendant is established. If assumption of risk bars
recovery only when the conduct of the defendant is unreason-
able, then it has no meaning independent of contributory negli-
gence. Since that defense is also available any time the conduct
of the plaintiff is unreasonable, it should be abolished as an inde-
pendent defense. Due to the enactment of the comparative neg-
ligence statute, it would be inequitable to allow plaintiff's conduct
merely to reduce recovery if the asserted defense is contributory
negligence, but completely bar recovery if assumption of risk is
asserted. Wisconsin has recognized this inequity and chosen
to merge assumption of risk with contributory negligence, so that
such conduct falls within the scope of the statute. Minnesota
should do the same.
